Christianity and Society

A False Catholic Protestantism

Wilhelm Pauck

Democracy and Power

Eduard Heimann

The Minister and War

Clifford Stanley

Book Reviews

LIBRARY OF EDEN Theological Seminary

Spring 1941

25 cents

V.6 #2

Volume 6 Spring 1941 Number 2

CHRISTIANITY AND SOCIETY

A Quarterly devoted to Christianity and Social Reconstruction.

PUBLISHED BY THE FELLOWSHIP OF SOCIALIST CHRISTIANS

CONTENTS

EDITORIALS: PAGE

Woe Unto Them That Are at Ease 1
Germans and Nazis 3
The Malvern Conference 3
American Response to the World Crisis 4
Conscription of Labor in Britain 5
Social Justice in a Defense Economy 6
Editorial Notes 7

A False Catholic Protestantism, by Wilhelm Pauck 9

Democracy and Power, by Eduard Heimann 17

The Minister and the War, by Clifford Stanley 21

Book Reviews 28

EDITOR
Reinhold Niebuhr

EDITORIAL BOARD
Eduard Heimann Clifford Stanley Richard Day A. T. Mollegan
Winnifred Wygal Harry Bone Rose Terlin Arnold Nash

Executive Committee Fellowship of Socialist Christians
Norman Sibley Eduard Heimann Richard Day Winnifred Wygal
Harry Bone Reinhold Niebuhr James Robinson
John Hutchison Charles Arbuthnot

Subscription Rate: $1.00 per year; 25c per copy.
4 Shillings per year in England.

Published Quarterly in December, March, June and September.

Editorial Address: Reinhold Niebuhr, 3041 Broadway, N. Y.
Business Address: Helen Lane Roberts, (Same as Editorial Address)
English Agent: Alan Richardson, Annandale, North End Road, London, N.W. 11

261

CHRISTIANITY AND SOCIETY

Volume 6 Number 2

EDITORIALS

Woe Unto Them That Are at Ease!

Amos 6. 1-3. "Woe unto them that are t ease in Zion and trust in the mountain of amaria. . . . Ye have put far away the evil ay and caused the seat of violence to come ear; that lie upon beds of ivory and stretch nemselves upon their couches and eat the mbs out of the flock and calves out of the idst of the stalls, that chant to the sound f viols . . . that drink wine in bowls . . . ut are not grieved for the affliction of oseph."

The prophet lived many centuries be- re the so-called "bourgeois" period of istory. But his description of the com- rtable and complacent classes of his day ts the general temper of the western de- ocracies so patly that it might have been ilored for them. The comfortable peo- le of the earth always "put far away the vil day and cause the seat of violence to me near." They are so secure that they nnot imagine the possibility of facing eat peril. They forget the basic inse- rity of all historic existence. They are e beneficiaries of some past violence d, having subdued the world about em through the conquest of their thers, they regard rebellion against the atus quo as unthinkable. They com- ound the gentleness of culture, the anting to "the sound of viols" with the dden violence of human existence and us persuade themselves that they have beguiled human history into a permanent peace. They "cause the seat of violence to come near" by this very complacency which "puts far away the evil day."

They are bound to invite some champion of naked force to destroy them by their very blindness to the problem of force in life. An atrophied structure of force and justice is always destroyed in the end by the resurgence of a basic vitality of human existence. The barbarians swoop in from the desert and destroy the lazy civilization which imagined itself secure in the river valley. Or the barbarians, generated in the very heart of civilization, suddenly challenge what is left of a complacent civilization with destruction.

All this has been true through all of human history. The reason the strictures of Amos fit a bourgeois civilization with particular aptness is that a commercial civilization has obscured the tensions and frictions of life behind the façade of trade and credit relations and falsely imagines that it has achieved a permanent peace amidst the conflicting vitalities of life. It combines this false rationalism of commerce with the illusory rationalism of its seats of learning. There, in its academies, various rationalistic illusions hold sway. But whatever the variety of the illusion, our wise men all believed it to be a fairly easy matter to create a culture and a civilization in

which mind, reason, knowledge or virtue would become so pure as to obviate the grosser forms of tension and conflict in human existence. Our bourgeois societies understood neither their own internal decay nor the external peril which had been generated by the Nazis as a horrible alternative to their own decay.

Let us call the roll. There was the Britain of Chamberlain understanding Hitler so little as to believe that it could beguile his fury with a few Birmingham bargains. It has atoned so heroically for these errors that one hesitates to mention them; but they belong to history. There was France, full of the vices and complacency of a soft civilization, crowning an inept military campaign by the mortal fear that Paris might be bombed, and preferring to have an enslaved but unbombed Paris to a free and partially destroyed one. There was Holland, despite its solid virtues, afraid to challenge Hitler's spies which were undermining the defences of the country, lest it might arouse him to enmity. Hitler had counted very precisely on this caution of the bourgeois soul. There were the Scandinavian countries, proudly assuming that they had transcended power politics and forgetting that their security depended on the British navy and the precarious balance of power in Europe. There is finally America trusting "in the mountain of Samaria" which in this case is the Atlantic Ocean, and imagining that our "way of life" is safe against all external peril, "if only" we purify it. There is no recognition of the fact that this external peril is actually a judgment upon our sins which we cannot escape. Nazism is both a false alternative to the unsolved problems of our economic life and a tyrannical and false solution to the problem of international anarchy to which we contributed by American irresponsibility in international relations. To argue that we can avoid this peril if only we would be good from now on is to disregard the tragic guilt of history. Our isolationists are saying in effect that if only we keep our liver healthy, no enemy can maim us by hitting us over the head. The judgment is politically wrong because a gangster can fell a healthy as well as a sick person, if the healthy person is not on his guard. The judgment is morally wrong for two reasons: (1) It fails to take account of our own sins which helped to produce the anti-social fury of the gangster; and (2) it commits the very sin of irresponsibility toward the problem of justice in the international community, which we previously committed and by which we helped the spirit of anarchy and tyranny to gain the ascendency.

Thus the illusions of a commercial civilization are subtly compounded with the "goodness" of a nation which does not know how equally sinful it is with other nations. Perhaps the lying "upon beds of ivory" could be used as a symbol of the illusions of a commercial civilization, and the "chanting to the sound of viols" could symbolize the illusions of a superficial religious and academic world, playing about with words and sounds which have no correspondence to the tragic realities of human history.

It is not necessary to press these analogies with Amos' indictment too exactly, however. It is important to realize that the whole modern world has been involved in a vast conspiracy of dishonesty and a gigantic self-deception. It has "put far away the evil day and caused the seat of violence to come near." Obviously if such a world will be saved at all it will only be "as by fire," that is, if it has purged itself of its illusions and its irresponsibilities.

Germans and Nazis

The Liberals of Britain have been arrying on a steady campaign against Sir Robert Vansittart's radio address in which he sought to prove that Germans re congenital disturbers of the peace in Europe and that their anti-social charac-er is established in ancient as well as in nodern history.

A recent correspondent of the *New tatesman and Nation* quotes a nine-eenth-century historian as follows: These people have a deep-rooted belief nat it naturally belongs to them to lead ne world and to control the policy of eighboring states. . . . They regard war ot as a sometimes necessary evil but as a ning to be enjoyed for its own sake, a oble and perhaps the noblest employ-ent of human force and genius." This ndictment, so similar to Vansittart's in-ictment of Germany, happened, how-ver, to have France, and not Germany, s its target.

On the other hand Lord Bryce wrote f the Germans: "The tendency of the eutonic mind was, and is, to the inde-endence of the individual life, to the utual repulsion of the 'social atoms,' tendency which is contrasted with the ndency of the 'Romanic' peoples to bsorb the unit in the mass.' "

All of this proves the absurdity of fight-g the Nazis by accepting their theory f race and reversing it to the disadvan-ge of the Germans. There is no ques-on that the Nazis could not have come power if there had not been some great eaknesses in German life and thought. ermans are traditionally more afraid of narchy than tyranny, they tend to be ncritically obedient to government, and hen they fashioned the Weimar democ-cy, they constructed it in rather abstract rfectionist terms. All these and many other weaknesses, including the romantic tradition in German culture, may help to explain the fact that the Nazis triumphed over Germany.

Yet this does not change the fact that the Germans are a highly gifted people, that Europe cannot be organized on peaceful terms without bringing them into a creative relationship to the European order, and that any policy of intransigeance toward them after defeat would prove suicidal. The Germans will have to learn that neither they nor Europe can afford Nazism. If that lesson is learned, the past will have to be forgotten. Hitler proves no more about basic German characteristics than Napoleon did about basic French characteristics. The combination of chauvinism and bourgeois idealism which informed the fury of the Napoleonic movement was not typically French. It was typical for that period of history and France became the embodiment of it through a concentration of circumstances. The romantic rebellion against bourgeois idealism which characterizes Nazism is not typically German. A whole series of cultural and political "accidents" merely made Germany the particular incarnation of this disease of our generation.

The Malvern Conference

So much has been written about the Malvern Conference of the Industrial Christian Fellowship of the Church of England, which met under the chairmanship of the Archbishop of York during January, that any comment in these pages may seem superfluous. What made the conference remarkable was that a meeting, "loaded" with bishops and high church dignitaries, should have adopted a series of very advanced resolutions in which the most thoroughgoing reconstruction of the economic and interna-

tional life of the western world was demanded and the church was called upon to give its support to these efforts at reconstruction. The resolutions were passed unanimously, though a final resolution offered by Sir Richard Ackland and declaring that "the structure of our society by which ownership of the great resources of our community can be vested in the hands of private individuals is . . . a stumbling block . . . making it harder for the generality of men to live Christian lives" was passed by a large majority, but not unanimously.

The fact that the main body of resolutions was passed unanimously was probably a sign of weakness rather than strength, for it seems to suggest that they were not thoroughly discussed. At any rate reports from Britain reveal that some members of the conference have already repudiated them. Whatever the limitations of the conference, it must be regarded as a remarkable milestone in the life of the church. Even if it is true, as alleged by some, that the personal authority of the Archbishop of York was more responsible for the resolutions than any unanimous sentiment among the members of the conference, the leadership of Archbishop Temple in the church and the nation, must be regarded as a highly significant fact. No one in Europe is giving a more intelligent expression than he to the Christian, and indeed the universal yearning for world community, and to the hope that this war may result in a genuine federation of the nations. His many analyses of this most basic and vexing problem are characterized by a high degree of Christian realism and idealism. They are truly statesmanlike utterances which reveal that the Church at its best can avoid the Scylla of irresponsible sentimentality and the Charybdis of easy compliance with the more self-righteous and cynical impulses of a nation at war.

Both Temple's leadership and the very considerable response which his thought elicits in Christian circles of Britain prove the falsity of the charge that if you are not a Christian pacifist you must perforce be a Christian militarist and must "put Christ in uniform."

American Response to the World Crisis

The congressional debates on the lend-lease bill have been instructive. They have proved that on the whole the American people are slowly but surely emerging from their isolationism and sensing the danger of a Nazi domination of the world. But they also prove that there is a very stubborn remnant of isolationism which refuses to concede that anything which happens in the world might seriously affect us either in terms of our national interest or in terms of peril to our characteristic civilization. Whether the help offered the democracies by the bill will be great enough and quick enough to stop Hitler is of course a question. If more help should be required and given we will face the sorry prospect of a divided nation which could achieve unity only by methods of propaganda and coercion. This prospect is so dismal that one must regard the effort of helping the allies to victory without war as the best possible statesmanship under the circumstances. If more help is required it may have to be given and the majority in the nation will probably want to give it. But the size of the minority which will resist such a solution represents a serious political problem.

The fact that big business groups on the one hand and religious groups on the other hand should have been most vociferous in their opposition to the lend-lease bill is indicative of that curious

mpound of gospel perfectionism and urgeois complacency which has in-med political life in America for a gen-tion. The view of the world which erges from this combination of ought mistakes the peace of the count-house for the peace of the Kingdom God. There are no obvious conflicts the counting house. All victories and eats are "bloodless" there, and the illu-n is created that the conflict of life th life and interest with interest has en abolished.

Life is much more tragic and majestic; victories and defeats are more sublime d more terrible than this civilization believed. The idea that we must not ke the venture of aid involved in the d-lease bill, because it might bring us o the war, is a part of the general dency of our culture to hide the un-asant realities and the tragic risks of from its eyes. Of course it may lead war. But failure to take these risks y lead to death.

nscription of Labor in Britain

After many months of discussion, a law nscripting labor has been passed in tain. Capital was not conscripted. e immediate problem which prompted law was the difficulty the Govern-nt had in removing workers from ir places of residence to the sites of nament production. The destruction industrial plants by bombing made s problem acute. The Government is king diligently to avoid actual con-iption by using the new statute as a eat in order to prompt a semi-volun-y compliance with military needs. Yet implications of the law are far-reach-.

Lord Winterton was quite right in uing, in his opposition speech, that measure implied a kind of socializa-tion of industry. The power to deter-mine "priorities" gives the Government the right and the means to give or to withhold a limited supply of labor to the needs of defense against the needs of pri-vate business. The Government can shut down or enlarge any enterprise by its dis-posal of labor resources. The Govern-ment has a monopoly, as it were, upon labor power, the indispensable material of all production.

Since the representatives of Labor are in charge of this monopoly of labor the arrangement seems safe enough. But this labor control must not be overrated. In the last war governmental control was instituted in many countries; and it is natural enough to put labor in control if labor is sharing the responsibilities of government. The workers are more likely to trust their own representatives than the Tories. But there are limits to such a program. It is not possible to keep labor conscripted in order to keep in-dustry socialized. The conscription of capital has been carefully avoided since this might create a precedent which could be perpetuated in peace time much more easily than the conscription of labor.

This is not to belittle or disparage the remarkable achievements of British po-litical democracy under the strain of the present war. But we must not make the mistake of regarding measures prompted by the technical necessities of war as per-manent achievements of democracy. War aims are as undeclared in the field of domestic politics as in that of foreign policy, and there is not yet any certainty of a permanent gain.

The political situation in Britain is all to the credit of labor. It was Labor which brought Churchill to power after the crisis of the Norwegian disaster and thereby laid the foundations for the pres-

ent morale and hope. It is because of the power of Labor that Britain is standing and fighting as she does, since the regeneration of Britain from Chamberlain's policy to Churchill's policy would have been unthinkable without Labor's part in it. But tragically this very moral credit is Labor's political weakness. Labor cannot threaten to withdraw from the Government in order to gain concessions. It is after all Labor's war. Yet Tory appeasers are able to wrest concessions by implied threats of non-cooperation. For this reason the highest measure of statesmanship will be required to transform the present moral advantage of Labor into a permanent political gain.

Social Justice in a Defense Economy

Everybody agrees that in the fight of democracy against tyranny the home front is of vital importance. The problems are clear but the strategic prospects are none too bright.

The central problem for many years past has been the issue of planned economy versus laissez-faire. Laissez-faire unleashed, not only the forces of technological reason and industrial initiative, but also those of private greed and anarchy. Liberty, as the absence of regulation, destroyed liberty, as the fulfilment of genuine human aspirations. Liberty has to be deliberately organized, and the most conspicuous thing which needs organization is a free man's right to work. It primarily depends on our instituting a comprehensive, cumulative building program, for peace or war, in the form of public works or slum-clearance or armaments, in order to give full employment to the machine-building and related industries—for the products of which no adequately steady private demand can be expected to be forthcoming.

Our public works program must be credited with having kept us afloat, but was too timid really to solve the problem. It had to keep outside the reservation of private business, which insisted on the coincidence of its own freedom from control with welfare and progress. Business privileges made it legal to withhold jobs and incomes from millions of workers for years.

This was the opportunity of the dictators. They grew fat on it. They destroyed or subdued business and provided for full employment and for the right to respect and self-respect that comes from decent work. They put all this into the service of their armaments; not only Hitler but also Stalin, who, in 1935, excused the meager results in consumers' welfare by reference to the necessity of arming. By this means Hitler gained the formidable advantage in military preparedness which prompted his aggression, and which may never be overtaken.

In this way the principle of planned economy is finally thrust back upon us. We now turn to planned economy not to realize the democratic right to work but to meet the military menace. That the defense economy is a planned economy can best be seen from the "priorities" which the administration institutes on vitally needed materials and skills in order to reserve them, in case of shortage, for defense, withholding them from the private channels into which they would otherwise be drawn.

All then hinges on the question, who is in control of the planning? The Roosevelt Administration is putting up a heroic fight to reserve this new instrument of power for democracy. Whether it can succeed in this depends, not on its own good will, but on the strength and insight of democrats in coming to its support.

For eight years now the democratic will of the Administration has shown more

trength than the democratic forces in he country as a whole—a most paradoxical situation, a blow in the face of the asy theory that the government is a ommittee of the ruling class for keeping lown the ruled. The Administration arried through a law which made collective bargaining obligatory at a time when here was no labor partner to such a bargaining. It thus implored labor to organize and take advantage of its rights. The Administration now makes Sidney Hillman supreme in the defense management, along with the head of General Motors, at a time when labor continues pending part of its limited energy in its nner war, showing more interest in locking defense measures than in democratizing them. The Administration makes Harry Hopkins and John Winant, f all men, its spokesmen with the British, in an obvious attempt to strengthen ritish Labor against the Tories, and us to strengthen its own democratic rive.

Sidney Hillman, in his fight with enry Ford's recalcitrance, has won a irmish and lost a battle, so far. A ten illion dollar contract for trucks was warded another manufacturer when ord insisted on his right to violate the bor standards laid down by the Administration. A 120 million dollar contract r aircraft tools had to be awarded to rd because there is no one else to produce them. When full employment is ached, one will no longer be able to fuse Ford any contract because that ould mean to restrict and delay the production of defense. That is unless democracy makes up its mind to force its ill on Henry Ford, one way or another. hat Roosevelt and Hillman cannot do is job alone is clear. The united support of all democratic forces in the country is required.

Editorial Notes

Mrs. Carrie Chapman Catt, venerable and revered feminist and peace advocate, has admonished women to speak louder in the cause of peace so that men may hear and turn from their evil ways, which lead to war. Thus is the rather too masculine explanation of the cause of sin: "The woman thou gavest to be with me, she gave me of the apple and I did eat," redressed after many thousand years by a rather too feminine excuse which places the whole onus of war and sin upon man, and pictures woman as an angel of peace futilely seeking to beguile man from the evil of his ways.

Mrs. Catt's explanation of the cause of war is merely one of many similar efforts in which the observer finds the cause of evil in some sex, race, class, generation or condition other than his own. This places him in the position of the righteous judge and the offended innocent. The most outrageous explanation of this kind has just come from that millionaire philosopher and revolutionist, Henry Ford. He has suggested that both Britain and Germany be given all possible aid until they both collapse and the system of greed, which both incarnate, collapses with them. That Mr. Ford, who, more than any American industrialist, holds out against giving labor a decent partnership in industry, should find it possible to isolate "greed" in the imperial systems of Europe, merely proves how blind human self-righteousness is. Mr. Ford has one thing in common with Stalin. He imagines that greed is the most basic sin and thinks himself free of it. He, as Stalin, does not know that the lust for power is more basic than greed and that men may be

free of the former and express the latter in extravagant degree.

Mr. Henry Luce, the editor of *Life,* has written a pretentious piece on foreign affairs in a February issue of *Life* entitled the "American Century." He pictures the plight of Europe, the necessity for America's intervening in Europe, for bringing order out of chaos, and for American brains, American power and American virtue organizing the world. This is an example of the wrong kind of interventionism, though the imperialistic motif in it is not primarily economic. It is spiritual. The basis for the whole program is American self-righteousness. Thus we can add one more variety to the old formula of explaining the sinfulness of the world. It is not men in general who bring us into war, but European men, and American men of genius and virtue will save the world from this fate.

A learned article in a Catholic magazine records the conviction that the world is in its present state because the Reformation broke the unity of Europe and destroyed the universal authority of the papacy, which overarched the nations and checked the autonomy of each. There is an element of truth here, yet there were wars in the Middle Ages and the Catholic religion had not destroyed the pride and self-will of men and of nations. That is not necessarily to its discredit, since there is no power on earth great enough to eliminate the sinfulness of man. It is to the discredit of Catholicism that it pretends to have achieved a "Christian" civilization and imagines that the only way back to peace is for all nations to accept the authority of the papacy again. This is just the same old error in another guise. In this case the Catholic looks upon the world from the vantage point of his self-righteousness.

It must not be inferred that the power of sin in history cannot be checked and that significant distinctions cannot be made between the righteous and the unrighteous. But no absolute distinctions can be made. Every such effort increases the pride of sin: for the final sin is committed at that place in history where the claim is made that sin has been eliminated. This applies to a Catholicism which regards Protestantism as the root of anarchy, to a Communism which believes that sin is isolated in capitalism, to a capitalistic liberalism which regards collectivism as the principle of sin, to a youth movement which equates youth with virtue and age with the vice of circumspect dishonesty, and to a feminism which imagines that only the male animal is driven by the lust of power.

A FALSE CATHOLIC PROTESTANTISM

By Wilhelm Pauck

The recent book by Dr. Charles Clayton Morrison, the editor of *The Christian Century,* entitled *What Is Christianity?* is rather characteristic of contemporary American Protestantism. It articulates the longing of many American churchmen for the rediscovery and revitalization of the "church." It displays also their fundamental uncertainty about the character of Protestantism. Coming from the pen of one of the foremost spokesmen of American Christianity, it is an astonishing document. Dr. Morrison makes a fervent plea for the realization of a new "catholicity," but in doing so he heaps scorn upon Protestant Christianity for the "heresy" which, according to his opinion, it has manifested from the beginning of its history until the present day. This condemnation of Protestantism is almost entirely unjustified because it is based upon an unwarranted, arbitrary interpretation of historical facts and ideas. It can therefore hardly be expected that the book will serve the purpose for which it was written. For how can one effect a re-orientation or a reformation of a historical movement if the historical character of this movement is not clearly and rightly understood? Dr. Morrison cannot hope to steer Protestantism in a new direction because he depicts Protestantism (which he claims is in need of a new leadership) not as it actually is but as he imagines it to be. To be sure, it is possible that his teaching may take effect, but if this is to be the case it will most certainly be beset by great difficulties, for the maltreated historical facts will be made to arise and take vengeance upon their misinterpreters.

Dr. Morrison's chief thesis is that Christianity is the self-revelation of God in history and that the bearer (or as he puts it, the *locus*) of this revelation is the Christian community, the church. "By the Christian church," he says, "I mean that particular human community whose historical continuum extends as far back as the beginning of the Hebrew people, a community which first emerged in history as an exclusive racial community, which passed, in the immediate presence of Jesus of Nazareth and by virtue of his life and work, into a community of the remnant of Israel, and which finally became the super-racial and inclusive community which we know specifically as the Christian church (p. 66). Of this community Jesus Christ is the center and the head. But he is the divine revelation only in so far as he is seen in connection with the community which, beginning with Abraham, God chose to be the carrier of his will. ". . . As a matter of historical fact, not Jesus, but the community of the Remnant was the actual connecting link in history between the Christian church that was before Christ and the specifically Christian church which Christian faith knows as the Body of Christ" (p. 123). "We may say with all literalness that the pre-eminent significance of Jesus lay in the fact that he saved Judaism. He saved it by separating it from Jewry. Jesus plucked the heart of Israel's faith

from the breast of racial Israel and, through a new community which he called into existence from a remnant of Israel, the divine revelation in Israel was passed on to the whole world." (p. 108.)

It must be doubted whether this interpretation of the beginnings of Christianity can be maintained by a reading of the New Testament and of the records of the ancient church. It is, of course, true that the early church understood itself as the true Israel and that it thus gave testimony of its conviction to be continuous with the chosen people of God's Old Covenant. But it did so not because it believed itself to be part of the "continuum" of history in which God revealed himself, but because it recognized Jesus as the "Messiah," the "Lord," in whom God had acted to reconcile the world unto himself. In the light of God's revelation in Christ, the Christian community recognized itself as the people whom God had called out from the world as the messianic Remnant in whom his will was to be realized.

Dr. Morrison is quite right when he insists that the faith of the New Testament is the faith of the church and that, from the very inception of the Christian movement, Christ and the church belonged together. It is indeed the distinction and unique feature of Christianity that the church is an integral part of its nature. Christology and ecclesiology cannot be separated from one another. This is one of the main insights of recent New Testament scholarship (of which Dr. Morrison, by the way, makes no mention). But it certainly is not permissible to attribute to ecclesiology a primary and to Christology a secondary importance, as Dr. Morrison seems to do. The entire "tradition" of the Christian movement bears testimony to the fact that the heart of the Christian faith is the acknowledgment of Jesus as the Christ, the revealer of God. The trinitarian and christological dogmas of the church were the first to be developed in order to safeguard this fundamental conviction and they have remained the primary concerns of all Christian thought and life. A believer in God's revelation in Christ is by the grace of his belief incorporated in the church, the body of Christ. Christ-faith and church-membership are simultaneous, for by becoming a Christian a person is placed in a new social relationship, the character of which from the very inception of the Christian movement has been described by the word *agape*. But as *agape* cannot be understood apart from Christ, and particularly the cross of Christ, the Christian community cannot be seen in its true character apart from Christ, its head. Jesus Christ is in all respects the *lord* of the church.

Dr. Morrison appears to recognize this. After having pointed out that Israel's consciousness of being God's chosen people was beset by the "fantastic and dogged obsession" with racial and national glory and that Jesus turned to the "inward Israel" and "deliberately created a community within the community of Israel to preserve the divine revelation and carry it on in history," he writes: "In his manner of doing this, Jesus added a new dimension to the revelation. The new dimension was himself. The mode of his messianic action in identifying himself in life and death with this corporate remnant of Israel, made him the center and head of the new community. He thus transformed the revelation. . . . The new Israel will be oriented toward God through the *living* Christ. This is the

new dimension of the divine revelation" p. 144).

This statement is right and wrong at the same time. It is right in so far as in it the centrality of Christ in the life of the Christian community is acknowledged. It is wrong in so far as this centrality is qualified by the curious interpretation of Christ as "the new dimension" of the divine revelation.

Dr. Morrison must use this strange term, for which, I believe, no parallel can be found in Christian theology, not even in Eastern Orthodox and Roman Catholic theology, because his fundamental thesis is that "it is a continuing community in history which, in its corporate existence, carries the revelation, and from whose specific orientation toward God its members derive their mental or spiritual patterns for perceiving the revelation of God in specific events" (p. 46). He goes even farther and bluntly declares that "the community *is* the divine revelation" (p. 0).

If this means anything, it means that the fundamental Christian teaching that God has revealed himself in Christ is seriously impaired. The community is made superior to Christ. For this reason, it is possible for Dr. Morrison to refer to the Jewish community of the Old Testament as the "*Christian* church" and to the community which Jesus founded of Israel's remnant as "that which we now *specifically* as the Christian church." The difference between Judaism and Christianity seems to lie in the difference between particularism and universalism. But, as a matter of fact, this difference is merely incidental to the central point of division between them, namely, the faith in the lordship of the crucified Christ.

In the light of Judaism, one can view the faith of the New Testament and Christianity as a continuation of the religion of the Old Testament (and some liberal Jews actually do so when they speak of Christianity as the daughter of Judaism). But in the light of the Christian faith, one cannot view the community of the Old Testament as part of the community of Christ by linking them both together as consecutive parts of the continuum of God's revelation in history (as Dr. Morrison does), for Christianity is not Judaism liberated from Jewry (as Dr. Morrison seems to think). It is the religious faith and life of those who, hearing and believing the gospel of Jesus Christ, receive the gift of the forgiveness of sins by the grace of Jesus Christ and lead lives of repentance and of love, while, under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, they recognize themselves as members of the church, the body of the living Christ. This is God's New Covenant. The Old Covenant is set aside. If it is nevertheless conjoined to the New Covenant, this is done in recognition of the fact that it is the same God who gave the law and the gospel, but the law of the Old Covenant is understood in the light of the gospel of the New Covenant. The continuity between them is not a direct one, but a broken one. The gospel of God's revelation in Jesus Christ, the crucified one, is not a reformed or universalized Judaism, but it is a radically new beginning.

Dr. Morrison has failed to take this understanding of Christianity seriously. In spite of the fact that it is his main purpose (as I shall try to show) to inaugurate an interpretation of Christianity which avoids the faults of the Protestant liberalism of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, he advances views which necessarily follow from the liberal interpretation of the New Testa-

ment. For liberal Protestantism (as well as liberal Judaism) have tried to reduce the religion of the New Testament to a purified form of the Jewish religion. Dr. Morrison's conception of the "continuum" of the divine revelation is an exaggerated version of the same error.

This failure to make the lordship of Christ as absolutely central as it is in the Christian faith causes him not merely to out-Judaize the Jews, but also to out-catholicize the Roman Catholics. According to Roman Catholic teaching, the church is the Kingdom of God and as such it is the body of the living Christ. As Augustine taught (*De doctrina Christiana III,* 31), Christ and the church are one person. The church is the continuing incarnation of the Son of God. Through the means of the hierarchy and the sacraments, his life pulses through the church. Without them, which according to Roman Catholic teaching, were instituted by Christ himself, the church could not be the body of Christ. But even Roman Catholicism gives full recognition to the headship of Christ. He is the lord of the church. The criticism which Protestantism has always levelled against Roman Catholicism is that it had conjoined with this authority of Christ the man-made and historically grown tradition, and that it has arbitrarily set up the hierarchy, culminating in the papacy, and the sacraments as the channels through which Christ exercises his authority.

Dr. Morrison calls Roman Catholicism the "great apostasy," not because it has qualified the lordship of Christ by adding the authority of its own historical institutions to it, but because "by the development of a self-contained sacerdotal hierarchy, the Roman Catholic Church abandoned the essential genius of the Christian community as, in its totality, the bearer of God's revelation, and vested the divine revelation and grace in a part of the community" (p. 198).

Also this characterization is partly right and partly wrong—in the light of historical fact. The Roman Catholic Church would never admit that the definition of the function of the priesthood implied in Dr. Morrison's statement is the one which it holds. Nor can it be said that Dr. Morrison's criticism of the Roman Catholic view is in accord with that which, since the Reformation, has been generally advanced by Protestants. They reject the Roman division between the clergy and the laity and teach the doctrine of the universal priesthood of all believers not for the reason that the Roman church has vested the divine revelation in part of the Christian community, but because they see in the hierarchy a delimitation of the lordship of Christ.

Dr. Morrison wishes to be even more catholic than the Catholics. He writes as if he meant to say that the total Christian community should hold the authority which according to the doctrines of the Roman church belongs to Christ and the ecclesiastical orders instituted by him and which according to Protestant teaching belong to Christ alone. Indeed this very thought seems to be his chief concern, for how can one otherwise understand his *dicta* about the continuum of the Christian community as the revelation of God in history?

But if one takes him at his word and goes on to inquire by which criteria he can assert that the Christian community is the bearer of divine revelation, he appears to answer that the Christian system must "be tested by the mind of Christ" (p. 260) and that "it is to the

Bible that the church must evermore turn in self-criticism" (p. 168). Thereby he would affirm the "orthodox" Protestant position. However, he really does not permit us to assume that he would answer in the way just indicated. For almost in the same breath in which he affirms the authority of Christ and the Bible he denies it. "The church and not the Bible is the revelation of God," he says (p. 168), and declares also (p. 165) that "the only Christ the Bible can give us is an ideological Christ," not the living Christ. If one then assumes that in speaking of the church as the living Christ and as the divine revelation he has in mind the Protestant teaching of the invisible church as the ground on which, by the power of the Holy Spirit, the visible church rests, he denies this also by the flat assertion that "this invisible church is only . . . an ideational church" and that "the church which the reformers had in mind was—in the *mind*," "not in history" (p. 236).

This is, of course, a wholly unwarranted, arbitrary opinion. But it is entirely in line with Dr. Morrison's analysis of the nature of Protestantism.

In dealing with Protestantism under the heading, "The heresy of Protestantism," he displays the animus which has caused him to speak of revelation and the church in the way described. What he has to say of the Reformation and the religion which it established is even more condemnatory than what certain Roman Catholic critics are wont to express.

He declares: "Protestantism, with its biblical revelation, privately interpreted, and its individualistic salvation as an unmediated transaction between God and the soul," provided a religion adequate for the spirit of the modern age (p. 257). When the reformers set out to restore Christianity, so we are told, "they found the Bible and individual Christian experience, but they missed the church, the divine community which produced the Bible and in which the individual Christian experience occurs" (p. 207). "We are saved by faith, they declared, not by the church, not by anything historical or objective at all, but by unmediated grace appropriated directly in the soul through personal faith. . . . Each man is saved by a transaction which takes place in his own soul, between himself and God, entirely apart from the church" (p. 203f.). "The Protestant doctrine of the church always presupposes the individual experience of salvation as primary, and the church as an association of those who have been thus saved" (p. 204). "Beginning in subjectivity it continues and ends in subjectivity" (p. 205).

Dr. Morrison even goes so far as to write down, black on white: "Protestant theory is more akin to Buddhism than to Christianity. It does not need a God in history at all; it requires only an *idea* of God. . . . The heresy of Protestantism consists of its substitution of a form of autosuggestion for the objective revelation and salvation of God" (p. 209). Yes, he even permits himself the extravagance to write: "Protestantism is Gnosticism" (p. 220). "The Gnostics tried to take Christ out of history. Protestantism has succeeded in taking him out of history. The Christ of Protestantism is an apparition. Luther succeeded where Marcion failed" (p. 220).

The best way to reply to such a definition of Protestantism would be to laugh him who is guilty of it out of countenance. But, alas, this characterization of Protestantism is offered by one of the most distinguished spokesmen of

American Protestantism. How is this possible?

Dr. Morrison cannot possibly be acquainted with the writings of Martin Luther. If anyone in Christendom fought against those very errors in the understanding of the gospel which Dr. Morrison attributes to the Reformation and to Protestantism in general, it was Luther. Which leader or writer of Protestantism, which church founder of Protestantism can Dr. Morrison have in mind? For what he says about the nature of Protestantism cannot be borne out by reference to the reformers, or to Wesley or Edwards or Schleiermacher. It would not even fit the founders of Congregationalism or George Fox and Barclay. None of them understood the Bible in the fashion which Dr. Morrison ascribes to Protestants. None of them spoke of an unmediated individual experience as the locus of salvation. None of them took Christ out of history. None of them failed to recognize the headship of Christ in the church. All of them, each in his characteristic way, gave testimony to the fundamental Christian and Protestant conviction that Christ and the church belong together.

None of them, to be sure, ever went so far as Dr. Morrison sometimes seems to go, although he really does not dare, as to make the church the primary bearer of God's revelation and Christ the secondary one. None of them failed to see in the church the *communio sanctorum* and the *corpus Christi*. The very teaching which Dr. Morrison, when he does not speak in extreme terms, declares that Protestantism lacks, they advanced.

But why then does Dr. Morrison undertake the frontal attack against Protestantism which, I think, is the central concern of his book. The answer is that he sees all Protestantism in the light of that evangelist, personalistic, individualistic religiousness which became a power in Protestantism all over the world, but particularly in America, during the nineteenth century. He argues against that Protestant religion which, after the separation of the church from the state, developed within modern individualistic bourgeois society and tried to defend itself against the encroachments of the "modern spirit" upon it by combining an individualistic view of religious experience and salvation with an uncritical, militantly "fundamentalist" Biblicism. He also opposes that more cultured Protestantism which in attempting to make itself respectable in the lecture halls and forums of "modern culture" endeavoured to interpret the Christian faith in terms of human autonomy and the Christian church in terms of the "social contract."

While it is utterly unjustified to identify all of Protestantism with these tendencies, it must be admitted that Dr. Morrison's criticism of these tendencies can be sustained—even in the name of the historic founders and interpreters of Protestantism.

Now, finally, we are in possession of the clue which enables us to understand why Dr. Morrison advances his strange theory that the Christian community is God's revelation in history, and why in his ecclesiology he is more Jewish than the Jews and more Catholic than the Catholics: In contrast to the subjectivistic atomism of the modern Christian church which he deplores, he puts a Christian collectivism.

Dr. Morrison writes these rather revealing words: "Mankind is itself in search of catholicity. It is done with individualism and the atomization of life into competitive and centrifugal

elements. The new world which is struggling to be born is controlled by the insight that the individual can find himself and the meaning of his life only in his concrete identification with his human fellows in a common life. The totalitarian states are an expression of the recoil from individualism. We currently characterize them as 'demonic.' Their demonic character, however, does not lie in their totalitarianism, but in the nationalistic or racial or class basis of their totalitarianism" (p. 259).

I do not think that this characterization of political totalitarianism is either realistic or profound. I have quoted it in order to show that Dr. Morrison is inclined to regard totalitarianism as the alternative to individualism. He falls from one extreme into another. Certainly, the totalitarian philosophies must be criticized not merely because of their nationalistic or racial ideologies. A Protestant Christian, who is imbued with the spirit of the prophetic faith of his ancestors, surely should not yield to the temptation to regard individualism and totalitarianism as the two exclusive opposites between which he must choose when he develops his social thought and program. But the sad fact is that Dr. Morrison cannot appeal to this spirit, because in his eagerness to extricate himself and the church from the throes of individualism, he has been led to despise the spirit of the Reformation and historic Protestantism. His failure to do justice to the historical Protestant movement thus takes vengeance upon him.

Had he taken the trouble to study Luther or Calvin, he would have encountered a powerful dialectical thought, at once strongly personal and social, but neither individualistic nor collectivistic. He would also have discovered a thought of the church in which Christ and the Christian community are so related to one another that neither Christ nor the church are dislodged from the real place they hold in Christian life. He would have found the way to the solution of the problem that troubles him. And he would thus have spared himself and his readers the advocacy of an un-Protestant and un-biblical catholicism, a catholicism which has no chance of being realized because it is unrealistic.

In answering the question, "What is Christianity?," Dr. Morrison should have developed his thought along the following line which I believe to be biblical and Protestant:

The authority on which Christianity rests and from which the function of the church is derived, is what in the historical thought of the church has been described as "the revelation of God in Christ" or "the living Christ" or "the holy spirit." Reference is thus made not to a specific historical event (the life, person, and teaching of Jesus of Nazareth) or to a specific body of literature (the Bible) or to a specific set of laws and orders (the creeds and canons of the historic churches), but to that spiritual reality which when it first became manifest in the person, life, and death of Jesus created for itself a fellowship (the *ecclesia* and *koinonia*) and which has been the creative ground of the Christian life throughout the ages.

It cannot be quantitatively defined as the totality of the church universal or as the total body of the church's tradition, nor qualitatively apprehended by abstracting a spiritual substratum or essence from its historical manifestations. It must be grasped in the act of faith within the concrete situation of life in a confrontation with the figure of the biblical Christ

and with a full realization of membership in the on-going community of the "body of Christ." The authority of the church is therefore no static norm, but a dynamic actualization of the "mind of Christ," ever as new as the present moment of history in which it occurs and ever as old as the divine word in Christ to which it responds.

The Christian ethic is the expression of the "holy spirit." It is significant that, throughout the history of Christianity, the interpreters of the holy spirit have insisted that as the "sanctifier" it is not only the agent of the peculiarly Christian personal experience but also the active ground of the Christian fellowship and community. Thus recognition was given to the fact that as Christ and the church belong together, the individual experience of God in Christ and membership in the community of believers in Christ are simultaneous. The Christian life is therefore characterized by the togetherness of individual decision and social obligation.

The nature of this life is best described by the New Testament term "agape." In contradistinction to all other kinds of love, it defines Christian love as a self-giving dedication and devotion to the other person without regard for his desert or merit. Living the Christian faith is an intensely personal act of fellowship-building.

It is important to note that because the Christian ethic is an ethic of "agape," which cannot be realized except on the basis of faith in God, it avoids and resolves in a significant way the conflict between an ethical absolutism and an ethical relativism which besets all other ethics. The commandment of love is absolute because faith derives it from God's own self-revelation and thus sets no limits to its validity and realm of application. It is relative in so far as it can be fulfilled only in concrete human situations. Every act of agape is thus as absolute as God is and yet as relative as every human situation is. As an expression of love, it is the same in every act of agape, yet it is unpredictable and unprecedented. Here lies the source of the creative character of the Christian ethic.

DEMOCRACY AND POWER

By Eduard Heimann

What democracy needs, and has been lacking all these years, is the will to power. This is true not only of the international issues but of the domestic issues as well. There are many reasons in the political and social construction of present-day democracy to explain the weakness of its will. But there are also the more general and deeper reasons of fallacious philosophy. Democrats used to be afraid of power, they did not want to employ it, thus they abandoned it to the enemies of democracy. Hence, it is vitally important to gain a new insight into the nature of power.

The word power will be used here in a very broad sense. We speak of a powerful personality, not only as a man who hits hard at his enemies, but also, without any enemies, has been given strength to shape things according to his vision and will as an artist or statesman, forcing our admiration for his qualities and achievements. We speak of the power of a Shakespearean play or of Bach's music in the same sense. This makes it immediately clear that democracy must not be afraid of power, which means simply the strength and nerve to achieve much, be it in the arts of peace or war.

It is true that power can be abused by representatives of democracy to enhance themselves and overthrow democracy. Power is equivocal and dangerous. It easily turns into oppression. Hence, the conclusion that if there were no power there would be no danger to democracy, and that democracy has to keep power down or out. But these conclusions are utterly wrong in theory and ruinous in practice.

Such an ambivalence is not limited to power. Everything in human life is exposed to abuse: beauty, love and religion. We must guard ourselves against abuse; but we must live. Since power is a force capable of achievement as well as oppression, one cannot abolish power without abolishing life. If democracy is powerless it means, on the one hand, that it cannot achieve what it would; and on the other hand, that it relatively strengthens its enemies, inner and outer. For there is never a vacuum of power. If democracy refuses to establish economic control, economic power accrues to those whom it ought to control. If, on the other hand, democracy destroys tyrannical power, it does not abolish power but transfers it to its free citizens, who become free only by thus being given equality of power. Democracy, then, is not absence of power, but a just distribution and effective organization of power.

The existing democracies are far from perfect because they are sorely defective in equality of power, and partly for this reason in effective organization of power. By allowing too many positions of privilege to survive, the effective concentration of democratic power is badly hampered. In a country of the free and equal, there would be no encroachment on the genuine rights of any particular group. The prototype of a simple, immediately evident, and incontrovertible right is that of the farmer in the land he cultivates. Financial claims, whatever their economic rationale, are of an extremely precarious nature, since they are always imposed by an absentee creditor. That no real agreement between free

and equal would ever confirm an arrangement which makes it legal to oust millions of workers from their jobs and incomes is equally obvious. Existing democracy, then, is sorely defective in equality of power.

But it is nevertheless a democracy because it gives us the civil and political liberties. Their deeper significance will be discussed later. Here they appear as the promise of the fuller democracy because they give us the right and weapons to strive for it. This again refers to the power issue. What makes the system of inequality a democracy is not the static right of the people to grumble, but the dynamic right and implied potential power of the people to change it into a fuller democracy.

While it cannot be over-emphasized, the need for defense against outside attacks is equally urgent at all times. Military power appears as essentially abusive power because it is coercive power in the most brutal sense of the word. Democracy, contrariwise, rests on reconciliation and agreement in its inner life and should consequently strive for the same method in international relations. Democracy and military power appear incompatible. But here again we have a confusion. Democracy rests on agreement and reconciliation between the free and equal, who respect one another's genuine rights and needs, but not on reconciliation with those who strive to destroy freedom and democracy. Defense is not conquest and annexation. It is not needed where there is mutual respect. But the cause of peace is not served by a democracy which is so weak as to invite attack by its enemy.

The Gandhi case is the best illustration of these principles. Gandhi based his policy on respect for his adversaries and oppressors, and they replied in kind. He was unarmed militarily, but not powerless, since they were susceptible to the greatness of his soul. It does not detract from his daring and initiative that he depended on their response; it was only he, not an ordinary rebel, who could have struck a sympathetic chord in his adversaries. But it was only they, not ordinary tyrants, who could thus be touched; only the joint effort of both partners to the conflict raised the issue to the higher plane. Gandhi is a saint, and is officially called so by his people. A saint is meek, but anything rather than impotent; his blessing imparts strength, and his look penetrates the darkness of the heart. There is no saint among western pacifists. And if there were, it would be of no avail in the conflict with Hitler because there would be no response. Gandhi himself has recognized this. On both grounds, pacifists are utterly mistaken when they believe that they could achieve with Hitler what Gandhi achieved with Halifax. And Halifax too was utterly mistaken when he believed that he could appease Hitler because he had attained reconciliation with Gandhi.

Democracy is peace founded on justice, through the limitation and reconciliation of conflicting claims. It goes without saying that democracy cannot lightheartedly go to war without having exhausted, even at the price of sacrifices, all imaginable attempts at reconciliation. But all such attempts may be fruitless because reconciliation requires mutual respect and self-restraint on both sides. Reason and right must be recognized as superior to ourselves in any act of reconciliation. Where reason and right are denied, it may still be possible to appeal to them and awaken the adversary to their binding validity. But there are the blind forces of destruction in the world—the things which the Bible calls evil. One cannot and must not reconcile himself

o wanton destruction. Democracy has o right to go down at the hands of evil; t has to defend itself.

This brings us to the most precarious hase of the discussion. It is argued that ne cannot defend democracy without osing it. Defense requires that concenration of coercive power which is by defiition the denial of democratic liberty nd democratic equality of power.

A reference to Lincoln may help us ere, as elsewhere. He did go to war, nd even suspended civil liberties, not in rder to abolish them, but to restore, preerve and extend them. This is absurd n terms of a static logic and of a purely nstitutional approach. It becomes inelligible and convincing if we undertand democracy as a living force.

It is only under normal conditions that emocracy can be expected to be directly eflected in its institutions. Conditions, owever, are far from normal today, and ave been so more often than not in hisory. Democracy as a living force, a ood and will, is more than democracy s a set of normal institutions working nly under normal conditions. The relaionship of democratic spirit and demoratic institutions, will, however, under bnormal conditions, not simply be susended for the time being, it will always e preserved in the dynamic sense that ie democratic will uses all available eans of policy to restore the full operaon of its normal institutions. On the ther hand, even in normal conditions healthy democratic will is not blind to ie existence of the evil which is always ing in wait and easily produces an emerency. Consequently the normal setup f democratic institutions will include ich precautionary measures as must be ounted upon to meet a possible emerency.

If it were true that it is nothing but the absence of coercion which delimits democracy under all conditions, it would not be possible ever to create democracy or ever to preserve it. The establishing of democracy is not a democratic act in the institutional sense. It required a "revolutionary war" to establish our democracy and Washington was all in favor of conscription as a safeguard for the future of our country. No wonder he was, after the terrible ordeal through which he had gone with an army whose every soldier could and did go home whenever he pleased. One may object that Washington was not a democrat proper, and that however undemocratic the origin of democracy, democracy cannot survive unless it repudiates the use of undemocratic means, such as coercion and violence. But the preservation of democracy likewise required a "war between the states" or even a "civil war." Lincoln went to war and had to resort to the suspension of civil liberties. It is here that the tension between democracy at war and its normal institutions reaches its climax and proves its solubility.

It is at the very best a limited solubility, however. Honesty requires us not to deceive ourselves on the limited nature of our faculties, nor on the width of the gap between the best we can do and the things we ought to do in any particular case. It requires us to love our enemies—that is to realize what we are doing to them. For there is almost certainly some right in their wrong, as there is some wrong in our best cause. This is tragedy, and we cannot escape it by denying its existence. Either we accept it in humility, bow our heads before it, and act as best we can, knowing full well that is far from good; or we pretend that it is no tragedy, and consequently cut off whatever possibility there may be to heal the wounds that we are in duty bound to in-

flict. In the first case we rise above tragedy, in the second we substitute savagery for tragedy because we are not strong and good enough for tragedy.

Of all great statesman of history Abraham Lincoln probably illustrates the necessary strategy of Christian statesmanship most perfectly.

Abraham Lincoln was no moralist or pacifist, nor was he an absolutist of his collective cause. He was a Christian statesman, probably the only one on a grand scale whom history has seen. He could not very well be in doubt that all his career was under the shadow of tragedy. He had to do all the things he most hated to do; but neither did he shrink from them nor did he palliate them or argue them away by theories which distort the roundness, richness, and goodness of human nature. He went to war, even to civil war, and it was the most ghastly war the world had seen for hundreds of years. He suspended civil liberties for the sake of concentration of all efforts on the one indispensable goal, victory. He was denounced as aiming at personal tyranny and dictatorship, by those who understand the machinery but not the spirit of democracy. He did all the hateful things in Christian humility and heroic determination, only to be slain when he could believe that he was emerging from the inferno. The spirit of Christian democracy inspired Lincoln to do all the hateful things in such a way that finally no one could misinterpret his motives. Everyone realized he was forced to do them by tragic necessity while not surrendering his belief and standards to that tragic necessity. There was not a word of hatred, bitterness or vindictiveness in him, there was only the insistence that those on the other side are our brethren even though we have to fight them. Unswerving in the jungle of tragedy, he became a shining symbol and powerful force in history. His sacred name has still more and greater things to achieve.

A REPORT OF PROGRESS

In our last issue we appealed to our readers to send us gift subscriptions for friends who might find our journal interesting and profitable. The appeal was answered by many orders of two to five subscriptions and resulted in our largest increase of readers in any quarter. We are, however, still short of complete self-support. We repeat, therefore, that we do not desire any gifts from our friends, but that we are grateful for every effort to extend our influence and our financial security.

THE MINISTER AND THE WAR *

By Clifford Stanley

When a conflict has developed those who are within its orbit fall into three groups. First, there are those who defend. Second, there are the attackers. Third, there are those who on account of principle refuse to be a party to the conflict. In the present conflict those who defend are symbolized chiefly by the words "Britain" and "democracy." The words expressive of the attacker are "Germany" or "fascism." The word "pacifist" suggests those who reject the method of conflict.

If you inspect these groups you find that each one thinks it is serving the right. For the moment we are interested not in the truth of this conviction but in its actuality. Take the defenders, the King, Churchill, the Archbishops, Cardinal Hinsley, are all sure that they defend Christian civilization and do it in the best way. Or consider the attackers. I have not listened to a German short wave broadcast lately, but some months ago they used to throw in this "plug" frequently, "Germany fights to correct injustice, England to perpetuate it." The Catholic bishops, meeting at Fulda, asserted the justice of Germany's cause and pledged support. More recently a number of prominent Italian bishops did likewise. In England the third position, that of the pacifist, is well represented by Canon Raven. It is a little more difficult to find representatives of this position in Germany since they are either in concentration camps or have been put to the sword.

On the basis of the best empirical evidence each of these groups bases its conduct squarely on the right. Now our problem is this: on a Christian view can we ratify these convictions and make sense of them? Do all of them, or for that matter any of them, find Christian justification?

I

Let us confine ourselves first to the defenders, to Britain. At first sight, defense, being a reaction to an attack, is a negative thing. In a deeper sense, defense is part of a positive action. It is an action whose intent is to perpetuate the existence of an already existing reality. The reality involved in the present case is not only a nation—the British Empire—but more particularly an age. This is the British age in the West, and for some decades now, the British age of the whole world.

While I speak of the British Empire I am not interested in it primarily for its own sake. I am interested in it because it happens at this moment to be the most vivid example of a wider reality. This wider reality is the whole procession of history, nations, empires and great ages. It is with the actualized nations of history not with dreams and intents that we begin.

The first thing to be noted about the nations of history is that God made them. We are familiar with the divine origin of Israel, how God through Moses brought

* Based upon an address delivered to the Missouri State Minister's Convocation, Columbia, Mo., February 18.

them from Egypt to the promised land. What we are less familiar with is the divine origin of all other nations as witnessed by their epics. In the Vedic poems of the early Indians the "Aryan gods" play an all important part. With the Greeks it is the Zeus of Dodona. Any one who studies the origin of historical nations is struck by the religious matrix from which they come. We might even generalize and say that no group can have a real history until it believes that the divine accounts for its existence.

The second thing to be noted is that God creates historical nations through this belief. God does many things in nature and for man without man's knowledge and cooperation. Historical life is one work that is not so wrought. Rather, since history depends on consciousness of history, God creates history through man. Since God makes history in this way, it is a joint production and dependent on the character of man to an unusual degree.

Creation is the first of the works of the Lord and the crown of creation is the stream of history and the nations thereof. Since God creates the nations of history, since His handiwork is both like Him and He is in it, the nations are holy. Since God makes nations through men, when men make and preserve a nation they do God's will. This is the basic obedience and the ground virtue. If we understood that the unity and coherence of things was of God and was God we would understand that nations live by virtue of God; and as long as they can continue to live God is in them. For this reason, to serve a nation and to keep it in existence, whatever that involves, is to serve holiness itself. And to lay hands violently on a nation, any nation, is to lay violent hands on the Holy and to resist the divine. I state this truth in an extreme, limiting form, in order that we may apprehend the principle clearly although I freely admit that it must be qualified sharply. Yet however much it must be qualified these modifications do not remove the basic truth. Though I have not subjected this truth to the Old Testament or Christian qualifications as yet, we see in it the basis in man's general religiousness of the first of our three roles, namely, that of the defender and builder.

II

There is a second role, that of the attacker. In our time this means primarily the German nation under Hitler. There have always been attackers. What can we say of this activity?

Until now no nation has lived forever and the presumption is that none will. The unity of the life of nations is sometimes broken from within, sometimes from without, more usually from a combination of the two.

First a word about the inner disruption. Every nation is made up of groups with varying interests. One of these groups organizes the life of the nation. Its own interest is served perfectly through the national organization. Some of the other groups also fare well. Some profit scarcely at all, some are outside the pale altogether. As long as the ruling group can serve the interests of others well enough all is well. There seems to be some statute of limitations on this capacity, however, and soon or late the ruling group finds its interests opposed to some or all of the other groups. The unity of society begins to disintegrate. Other groups lust against the ruling group. Partly they desire to be master. Partly, however, they desire justice.

Then there is outer attack. As a matter of record, no nation or empire has long

been free of it. These attacks come from the pride, ambition and brutality of other nations, no doubt. But there is something deeper involved. Every nation, every great order, in a world of limited resources, by its very existence robs other life. The attack on them by this other life serves justice. The evidence of this is in the lips of the attacker. Partly this is self-deceit and window-dressing. Unfortunately this is never entirely the case. Every great nation and world order robs other life enough to justify attack on it. This is the ethical justification of attack. Every attacker attacks in the name of his god, who will give him the victory. "This," we say with assurance, "is simple paganism."

The remarkable thing, on the contrary, is that the prophets, the very servants of the jealous God, do not repudiate this truth out of hand but rather confirm it, although with sharp qualifications. It is indeed God, say the prophets, who raises up these attacking forces, both inner and outer. Let me present a little evidence. To me the most interesting case of all is that of Habakkuk, for he works out more of the problems involved than perhaps any of the other prophets. In Habakkuk's book God says (1: 16), "For lo, I raise up the Chaldeans, that bitter and hasty nation, which shall march through the length and breadth of the land, to possess the dwelling places that are not theirs." He does this in spite of the fact which Habakkuk points out and God does not deny that in this case "the wicked devoureth the man who is more righteous than he" (1: 13). He does it in spite of the fact that the Chaldean attributes the victory to his own prowess and to his idols. God answers by saying that He has a rod to chastise the rod with which he now chastises Jacob. An equally clear statement that God raises up the attacker reappears in Jeremiah. These are his words, "For thus saith the Lord, Behold, . . . I will give all Judah into the hand of the king of Babylon, and he shall carry them captive into Babylon, and shall slay them with the sword." (20: 4.) Perhaps the most remarkable statement of this truth is found in Isaiah (45: 1, 4), "Thus saith the Lord to his anointed, to Cyrus, whose right hand I have holden, to subdue nations before him. . . . For Jacob my servant's sake, and Israel mine elect, I have even called thee by thy name: I have surnamed thee, though thou hast not known me."

This perception that God executes His will through the attacks of men upon one another is perhaps the central insight of the prophets. Let me make several uses of it immediately. First, one who attacked another might very well feel that he did God's will. In fact that is the very thing he should do according to the prophets. Cyrus should have attributed his victory not to his own arm, certainly not to any idol, but to the one God of all the earth. Here we have grounded our second vocation, namely, that of attack, squarely on the prophets and lodged it in the heart of the Old Testament.

The implication of this God-originated attack is that man deserves it. So a companion insight of the prophets is the conviction of the general wickedness of man. This is the continuous word of the prophets to Israel and Judah: "God punishes you for your sins." Prophetic theology generalizes this teaching about the sinfulness of man in the doctrine of the Fall in Genesis. Jeremiah proclaims it in his call for a law written on the heart in contradistinction to the law written on tablets of stone of which man is an enemy.

This yields an important point about history. History as we saw is not only the work of God but a work of God

through man. *And man is always a sinful man.* Consequently the good work of God in history is always spoiled by man. This is the reason God raises up attackers against nations. His holiness demands their punishment. So if His first word to a nation is a word of creation: "Let there be life," His second word is a word of punishment: "Let there be death." But, as Habakkuk understood, the attacker is a sinful man also, sometimes more sinful than the one he attacks. So God has a rod for the attacker as well. There seems to be no end to this regress. No one is established in goodness beyond the need of a rod of correction. Indeed I believe that this is as far as the prophets got.

Before we leave the point it is well to recall that this attacking, destroying, death-dealing work is a good work. The attacker bears God's commission and to resist him is to resist God.

III

This brings us to the third function, the calling of peace.

Peace is undoubtedly based upon God. God is at unity with Himself and peace is but a name for this. God's peace is in those men through whom He creates nations; and peace is the normal, the healthy, state of those nations. Peace, being unity, is basic. Strife is secondary and parasitic. The law of human nature, the law of Moses, the grace of Christ, all say one thing: peace.

The observation of the course of nations agrees with the teaching of the prophets, that all men in history are sinful. This has some interesting effects on peace. Peace in this world is sought by men who are always sinful. We are used to saying that their strife comes from sinfulness, as indeed, it does, but so does their peace come from sinfulness. Their peace comes from their strife and their strife from their peace.

First, "their peace comes from their strife." Here we call as witness some remarkable words of St. Augustine. "Who will not confess this with me, who marks man's affairs, and the general form of nature? For joy and peace are desired alike of all men. The warrior would but conquer: war's aim is nothing but glorious peace: what is victory but a suppression of those who resist, which being done, peace follows? So that peace is war's purpose, the scope of all military discipline, and the limit at which all just contentions level. All men seek peace by war, but none seek war by peace. For they that perturb the peace they live in, do it not for hate of it. . . . They would not disannul it, but they would have it *as they like* . . . " (Bk. 15, Ch. xii, p. 140, *City of God,* Temple Ed. (Author's italics).)

Augustine says justly that "men do not seek war by peace" but that is what they bring about none the less. Take an illustration or so. The aim of Hegel was peace, the unity of all existence in an ideal process. But his very effort to unify life *as he liked* stirred up Marx, the aged Schelling and Kierkegaard to oppose him. Marx wanted peace, *as he liked,* on the basis of the proletariat, and himself sowed much of the dissension of our time. Hitler wants peace *as he likes it,* on the basis of Fascism and German rule, and he reaps strife. The Allies wanted peace *as they liked it* at Versailles. As treaties go, Versailles was not so bad. Its great idea was national self-determination from which flows directly many of our present ills.

The men of this world are sinfully partial. Their interests and insights are contradictory. Since they are contradictory they cannot be compounded so one

r the other must be chosen. Whichever ne is chosen, injustice is done to the ther. For this reason the prophet saw hat enduring peace is clearly beyond istory. It presupposes a miracle and is o be enjoyed in the Messianic age when he Kingdom of God is fully come. Who an miss the miraculous, supra-historical haracter of these words, "And there shall ome forth a rod out of the stem of Jesse nd a Branch shall grow out of his roots: nd the spirit of the Lord shall rest upon im. . . . The wolf also shall dwell with he lamb, and the leopard shall lie down vith the kid: and the calf and the young ion and the fatling together; and a little hild shall lead them . . . and the suckling hild shall play on the hole of the asp nd the weaned child shall put his hand n the cockatrice' den. They shall not urt nor destroy in all my holy mountain, or the earth shall be full of the knowlidge of God, as the waters cover the sea." Is. 11: 1, 6, 8-9.) "And it shall come to ass in the last days that . . . they shall eat their swords into plowshares and heir spears into pruning hooks: nation hall not lift up sword against nation, either shall they learn war any more." s. 2: 2, 4.)

As we look back over the callings we otice shortcomings in each. The first ne provides vitality, actuality, but conuses God and man. The second sepatates God and man so entirely that God's fe is withdrawn and the nations perish. he third is frustrate because historical eace always comes from war and gives se to it. Wretched men that we are, ho will deliver us? We all know the aceful answer to this question, an anwer which names the deliverer in the act thanking Him—"I thank God through sus Christ." Now the question is, hat does the deliverance of Christ mean? Certainly it does not mean a simple extension and improvement of the old life. St. Paul says, "If there had been a law that could make alive, then righteousness would be the law." The old situation is a failure in principle. To accept Christ means to leave the old situation and its possibilities in principle. This is what the Gospel means by taking up the cross and denying oneself. It is what St. Paul means by crucifying the world, dying with Christ.

But the life in Christ is not simply the life of the Kingdom of God either. First, let me quote the Scripture. St. Paul says explicitly, "Flesh and blood cannot inherit the Kingdom of God." (I Cor. 15: 50.) In this passage he is speaking to the redeemed. It is redeemed flesh and blood which cannot inherit the Kingdom of God. Again in Romans 8, which may well be the summit of the Pauline literature, St. Paul says, "Ourselves also, which have the first fruits of the spirit, even we ourselves groan within ourselves, waiting for the adoption, to wit, the redemption of our body." (v. 2, 3.) He says clearly that even Christ cannot in this world do certain things for us, things so profound that we "groan" because of their absence. He speaks of Christ's work for us here as "first fruits." What we lack is the "redemption of the body." In our terms this means that there are certain objective limits to salvation in this life, things that in this world even Christ cannot do. What I would suggest is that even a saved man must be a real, a living, breathing man. To stay alive he must accept the realities of this world. Furthermore, those realities have become inherently sinful. You simply cannot uproot the tares without destroying the wheat. So that a man whether he be Christian or other must be alive to be a man at all and to be alive is to be sinfully alive.

So we have denied that the Christian

life is a possibility of "this world." We have denied that it is a possibility of "the world to come." Now we are ready for a positive statement. The Christian life is composed of elements of "this world" and of "the world to come." It is a new life in which these two ingredients dwell together and influence one another. On the one hand, the irreducible structural elements of sin and strife qualify the achievements in us of the "world to come." This is the price of having a real world and actual nations. On the other hand, the "world to come," brought to us by Christ, brings notable additions to this world. First it brings forgiveness for this inescapable sin, the miraculous, reason-defying "justification" wherein the unrighteous is declared to be righteous. Second, the "world to come" gives to men some of its own powers, powers not based on this world. In plain words, new moral powers come into the world with Christ, and achievements not possible outside of Him.

We have one more brief task, to apply these Christian principles to our several callings. In doing so I will deal only with the ones we are apt to find in this country, namely, the defender-builder, on the one hand, and the pacifist on the other.

First, a word about the man who makes and, if necessary, defends actual nations. We are assuming that he is in Christ. What does this do for him? Even though he is a Christian he is a real, historical man. That is, he participates in a nation which though splendidly actual is also sinfully partial. Yet it is precisely this sinfully partial kingdom that God by grace incorporates in his own realm. The activities, which to the eye are transitory, are eternal through grace and the doings, which to the conscience are sinful, are declared to be righteous. What God hath cleansed let no man call unclean. Here may I say parenthetically that this man may not accept his forgiveness unless he acknowledges the roles of the attacker and of the pacifist. On my principles any one of these roles falls to the ground which does not acknowledge the other two.

On the other hand, this builder of nations and defender thereof has new possibilities through Christ. What are these? To name one, he struggles in a new way, if struggle he must. He realizes that his enemy has a point; he realizes that he himself has sins, which God has forgiven. This is important. The real horror of human conflict is the tendency of each opponent to see only good in himself and evil in his enemy. Finally our side is reckoned to be as perfect as God, which is to trench on God and the other side is held to be as bad as the devil, which is to turn a natural adversary into a supernatural principle of evil. This is the purest paganism and it is ever rendered impossible to those who are really in Christ. I assert that this makes a difference in the quality of struggle. It is short of the pure Kingdom of God since struggle is still present. But it is more than is possible either to paganism or to the Law of Moses. But Christ brings even more than this mitigation of strife. A nation permeated in any degree by his spirit will literally give more justice. It cannot give perfect justice, so that sooner or later it will have to be demolished. But its relatively greater justice will extend its life and postpone conflict. Thus Christ mitigates conflict and he decreases the amount of conflict. These are the most he can do in this world and I think it is a lot.

I must say a word about the vocation of the pacifist. This is done because the principles here advanced require that role. The peace that is of this world is

both the fruit of strife and the cause of it. So our peace requires repentance as much as our war. To insist on empirical peace, peace in this world, is to confirm some egotist somewhere in his kind of peace and to lock the door of liberative struggle to some victim somewhere. For these reasons those of us who are on the mourner's bench must move over to provide room for the man who would set up any perpetual peace in this world.

The Christian pacifist brings something of the "world to come." Through his faith and ours he becomes to us a sacrament of things unseen. First, he witnesses God's unity and peace. The struggles of men, especially if commanded of God, seem to disrupt the unity of His Being, perhaps really do so. The pacifist pleads the unity in God behind the apparent or real disunity. Since the men who build and defend resist God's rod of correction and since the rod of correction does violence to God's creation, both oppose God. The pacifist bears witness to the reconciliation and peace between God and both of these men. If the struggles of this world, however mitigated and diminished, are the last word about the divine-human enterprise, "if in this life only we have hope in Christ we are of all men most miserable." The pacifist bears witness to a unity between contenders that is deeper than their struggle and that outlives them. He keeps us "groaning" in this body of struggle, awaiting the "redemption of the body" when there shall be no more war at all.

I have not said that a man should support the war nor that he should not support it. I have tried to show how men who are in Christ could do one or the other. If there is any virtue in my approach it is that I have shown how a man can follow Christ one way and yet not thereby forbid another way but rather require it. But the really important thing is to follow Christ as one is given to see the matter. May I close with a quotation from Phillips Brooks, which I have hanging on the wall of my study? "This truth comes to us more and more the longer we live that on what field or in what uniform or with what aims we do our duty matters very little or even what our duty is, great or small, splendid or obscure. Only to find our duty certainly and somewhere, or somehow to do it faithfully makes us good, strong, happy and useful men and tunes our lives into some feeble echo of the life of God." And a greater preacher than Phillips Brooks said, "It is required in stewards that a man be found faithful."

BOOK REVIEWS

THE GERMAN PEOPLE VERSUS HITLER, *by Heinrich Fraenkel.* London, George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1940. 370 pages. 10s. 6d.

GERMANY: JEKYLL AND HYDE, *by Sebastian Haffner.* New York, E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1941. 318 pages. $2.50.

These two books are useful additions to the literature on the distinction between the Nazis and the German people. Heinrich Fraenkel, now a member of the refugee colony in London, has written for *Time and Tide* under the nom de plume "Cinna." Sebastian Haffner is a young German lawyer who worked for six years under the Nazi regime. Both writers are acquainted from personal experience with recent developments in Germany; both books show knowledge of the mass of literature on the subject.

While the two authors agree on the existence of opposition to the Nazis within Germany, their estimates of its extent vary considerably. Fraenkel writes " . . . the vast majority of the German people is opposed to the regime." Haffner includes only 40 per cent of the people in the opposition category (35 per cent disloyal, 5 per cent active opposition) and claims that a majority of 60 per cent are partisans of the government (20 per cent Nazis, 40 per cent loyal population). On the one hand, Fraenkel is very optimistic about the growth and future success of the disloyal elements. He believes Hitler was forced into war by increasing unrest at home, and that in spite of wartime restrictions the German people will soon have rid themselves of Hitler. On the other hand, Haffner maintains that the opposition, in a minority even before the war, are in a hopeless position so long as Hitler is successful abroad. While many of the disloyal elements desired war as the one way to secure Hitler's overthrow, the possibility of effective opposition has been decreased by the war situation. Haffner believes that a revolution can succeed only after the Nazis have been defeated from outside. To the reviewer, this latter interpretation appears far closer to the facts.

Fraenkel's book is useful mainly because he has collected interesting data on the avenues and forms of opposition to the German government. He treats in turn the situation among labor groups, churches, students, women, peasants, shopkeepers, etc., drawing largely on materials collected by the underground movement. Haffner's book is of more general value. His analysis of the relation of the Nazi mentality to the attitudes of the German people as a whole is very revealing. So also is his discussion of allied war aims. He believes the English should not plan to be chivalric with the Nazis themselves, but that they could muster the support of the opposition groups, in particular the emigres, more intelligently than at present. His suggestions at this point are important.

In the growing excitement of war, the distinction established in these books between the Nazis and other elements of the German population naturally tends to break down. Recently British voters were asked by the British Institute of Public Opinion: "Do you think our enemy is the German people or only the Nazi government?" The replies were: German people, 52 per cent; Nazi government, 48 per cent. Seven months earlier the reply to the same question had been,

German people, 41 per cent; Nazi government, 56 per cent; undecided or without opinions, 3 per cent. This stiffening of attitudes is inevitable under the conditions of modern warfare. Yet we do well to insist on the fact of diverse groups within Germany. Only that way is it possible to recognize potential allies within the enemy nation. Only that way is it likely that a peace purely of punishment can be avoided.

DOROTHY FOSDICK.

THE PRESENT AGE AND TWO MINOR ETHICO-RELIGIOUS TREATISES, *by Soren Kierkegaard.* Translated by Alexander Dru and Walter Lowrie. London, Oxford University Press.

It has been suggested that modern man cannot survive unless he can recapture the meaning of his symbols. Certainly the present age is not without diagnosticians nor prescriptions. But too few of the modern analysts are capable of discovering their own internal sickness. Perhaps the confusion of the present hour is indicated in the wide variety of cures which have been suggested. On the present scene one may choose anything from pacifism and "union now," to "total military preparation," and be quite assured by "responsible persons," that his way is *the way.* Yet there is a disturbing uncertainty about any and all of these schemes —an uncertainty which arises from the conviction that it will require more than schemes to secure the loyalty of a man's own conscience. That is a religious commitment. It was in this vein that Kierkegaard warned the present age when it was 100 years younger:

"It is quite impossible for the community or the idea of association to save our age. . . . It is only after the individual has acquired an ethical outlook, in face of the whole world, that there can be any suggestion of really joining together" (p. 61-62). The fact that such counsel is so timely in the present crisis, is fair demonstration of the timeless quality of Kierkegaard's thought.

Indeed, no lengthy excuses are necessary for the appearance of this volume at this time. It speaks to an age of inaction so lacking in "the riches of inwardness" that it would rather "advertise" and "publicize," than act with revolutionary force. The main essay, *The Present Age,* comprises the latter part of a review of a novel, *The Two Ages.* The other treatises consist of meditations on the query, "Has a man the right to let himself be put to death for the truth?" which Kierkegaard called "a poetic experiment," and "of the difference between a genius and an apostle."

Kierkegaard stamped the passionless, "calculating intelligence" of his time as moral quibbling. He pictured its lack of decisiveness as a people who would cheer the skater who *appeared* to venture into the danger zone of a frozen lake, but who, they knew, never really risked his life. Kierkegaard concluded that "intelligence has got the upper hand to such an extent that it transforms the real task into an unreal trick and reality into a play" (pp. 8, 9). Perhaps the weight behind this accusation is Kierkegaard's polemic against Hegeleanism. He never tired in his efforts to unmask what he believed to be the hypocrisy of the prevailing philosophical thought of his time which, he said, "reduces the inward reality of all relationships by means of a reflective tension which leaves everything standing but makes the whole of life ambiguous" (p. 15). This tendency toward "reflective tension," Kierkegaard singled out as the

"negative unifying principle" of his own age.

Kierkegaard surmised that the consequences of frivolous reflection are moral "ressentiment" and the process of *levelling*. "Levelling," wrote Kierkegaard, "is a silent, mathematical, and abstract occupation which shuns upheavals" (p. 27). For Kierkegaard levelling meant "the predominance of the category generation over the category individuality." Kierkegaard did not hesitate to use his own humiliating experience as the object of the newspaper *Corsair's* merciless attacks, as an example of the levelling process. He likened the *Corsair* to a dog which the public set upon outstanding men in order to amuse itself. Such a condition was far more tragic than the grinning spectators of his own age realized. With prophetic insight Kierkegaard insisted that the person attacked is always the stronger, that "in this case the terrible and ironical truth applies: weep not over him but over yourselves" (p. 47). Dr. Reinhold Niebuhr writes in the same vein to the present age when he remarks concerning man's attitude toward ultimate tragedy, "If only we can weep for ourselves as men we need not weep for ourselves as man" (*Beyond Tragedy*, p. 168).

It must not be assumed that Kierkegaard was a supernaturalist who opposed any form of rational inquiry. "Reflection is not the evil," he maintained, "but a reflective condition and the deadlock which it involves." Reflection as an escape from action and as a shield behind which empty souls were hid—this was the object of Kierkegaard's scorn. His age was deceitful. It lacked the "passion" of dialectic force. It possessed the knowledge of "which way we ought to go and all the different ways we can go, but nobody is willing to move" (p. 60). As in the present age there was an abundance of diagnosticians, but no surgeons. Kierkegaard concluded that there is but one alternative, either "the dizziness of unending abstraction or saved forever in the reality of religion" (p. 64). Man must be driven beyond the last elusive shadow to the consciousness of himself as an individual, alone, before God.

"Then it will be said: behold, all is in readiness, see how the cruelty of abstraction makes the true form of worldliness only too evident, the abyss of eternity opens before you, the sharp scythe of the leveller makes it possible for every one individually to leap over the blade—and behold, it is God who waits. Leap, then, into the Arms of God" (p. 64-65).

Has a man the right to let himself be put to death for the truth? This was no academic question with Kierkegaard. It had haunted his mind since childhood. He warned the reader, as he girded himself to deal with the problem, to lay aside all customary ways of thinking. Otherwise the problem would be nonexistent. The inability of our own age to deal with this problem in these times is further evidence of its confusion. We would, perhaps, phrase the question in this manner: "Is there anything worth being killed for?" Not so with Kierkegaard. For him it was essentially a religious question: "Dare a man let himself be put to death for the truth?" Kierkegaard dismisses the suggestion that the question was answered by Christ for each of his followers by his own choice. Christ was not a mere individual. He is related to the entire race as Saviour. His death is the atonement for all men. His *will* to be put to death is in eternal agreement with the Father's will. No man dares to claim such an accord with the Father.

But the question remains: "Does there exist for the individual man, in compari-

son with other men who are at strife with him, an absolute duty towards the truth?" (p. 110.) It must be kept in mind that the proposition is that under no condition will the person under consideration yield in his attitude toward the truth. For if it were possible for a man to be in absolute possession of the truth, to yield even one point would be criminal. Hence as regards his duty toward the truth, the man who permits himself to be put to death for the truth, judges the world in its attitude toward the truth. To a lesser extent every conscientious objector judges his own age, and the *Christian Century* is correct when it comments editorially concerning the Union Seminary student objectors, "Criminality on trial steps down, and the law finds itself in the dock. The prosecutor becomes an object of pity. The judge is himself judged." But the opposite is equally true. The man who in relation to other men, concludes that he is in such possession of the truth that he permits himself to be put to death for the truth, or even confined to prison, is himself subject to judgment in his attitude toward the truth. Hence, Dr. David Roberts makes the significant observation that the attitude of the student objectors "seemed to be one which judged the legislation of this country against a standard of perfection . . ." Kierkegaard believed that no man is in absolute possession of the truth, and hence he concluded that no man has the right to let himself be put to death for the truth:

"Every man is himself a sinner. He is related, therefore, not as a pure man to sinners, but as a sinner to sinners; for this is the solidarity of all mankind in the fundamental relationship to Christ" (p. 27).

The concluding treatise in this volume deals with the difference between a genius and an apostle. Perhaps this may be considered as an appendix to this discussion on the *Present Age*. For here Kierkegaard deals with the manner in which science and learning have confused Christianity. Aesthetics tends to equate genius and apostle, speaking in exalted terms of St. Paul's brilliance and profundity, etc. But this is to confuse the temporal with the eternal. Genius is measured by its historical content. "An apostle is what he is through having divine authority. *Divine authority is qualitatively, the decisive factor*" (p. 144). Now since history may select its geniuses, but only God can choose an apostle, there remains an essential difference between a genius and an apostle.

There may be some question as to the value of this volume for the present age. But for the reviewer no such question exists. It is as timely as the day's news. Its analysis of an impotent world is mirrored in every dispatch. Its appearance at this time demonstrates what Kierkegaard could not know: that a man may be both genius and apostle. For Kierkegaard's own age stamped him as a genius but failed to take seriously his prophetic message; today amidst our own religious confusion, this is a voice which rings with apostolic power.

CHARLES STINNETTE, JR.

THE RISE OF THE SOCIAL GOSPEL IN AMERICAN PROTESTANTISM, 1865-1915, *by Charles Howard Hopkins*. Yale University Press. $3.00.

THE SOCIAL GOSPEL RE-EXAMINED, *by F. Ernest Johnson*. Harper & Brothers. $2.00.

These two volumes are added testimony to the growing critical interest in the Social Gospel, and one hopes, to the increasing maturity of the movement it-

self. "The Rise of the Social Gospel in American Protestantism" is, as the title suggests, a comprehensive history of the Social Gospel movement from its beginnings in the post civil war period to its institutional embodiment in the Federal Council of Churches. It is, moreover, an account characterized by careful and thorough scholarship, admirable judgment, and a clear prose style. Not the least virtue of this book is that it does justice to the actual complexity of the sources of the Social Gospel. The major thesis is as follows: "The social gospel . . . may be regarded as American Protestantism's response to the challenge of modern industrial society." But this is by no means the whole story. Other roots which go deep into the soil of American Christianity are also probed. The "enlightened conservatism" of the nineteenth century, represented in such men as Henry Ward Beecher, Horace Bushnell, Phillips Brooks, and others, speaking of a God of love, of human progress and similar themes may be said to have prepared the ground for the work of later and more forthright thinkers on social problems. An older "evangelicalism" extending as far back as Jonathan Edwards, and represented in such men as Charles G. Finney sought in distinctively religious terms to bring the Kingdom of God to America. From the liberalism of New England the Social Gospel got deep infusions of humane and ethical thought. The recovery of the teachings of Jesus gave the movement the force of a scriptural criterion. And surely not the least potent influence was the impact of evolutionary and scientific thought in the ideas of divine immanence and human progress.

The complex product of many diverse strands of thought, the Social Gospel movement is traced from its first faint stirrings in the Gilded Age to its formulation by Rauschenbusch and its ecclesiastical embodiment in the Federal Council of Churches. The pioneer efforts of Washington Gladden, Bishop Henry C. Potter, Edward A. Washburne, Richard Heber Newton and others are described. Troubled by the apparent selfishness which lay at the heart of classical laissez-faire economics, perceiving the shortcomings of competition as an exclusive social mechanism, and seeing the bitter fruit of such a society in the exploitation of labor, these men set in motion a process of critical thought, which once launched went far beyond their first suggestions of "applied Christianity," "the Golden Rule" and the like as a solution for any and all problems of society.

As it entered the decade of the eighties, the youthful movement was enriched by new currents of both theological and ethical thought represented in such men as Theodore Munger. Criticizing socialism and rejecting it as a solution to social problems, liberal Christians nonetheless pointed it out as a symptom of underlying maladies. Despite deep mutual hostility on the part of church and organized labor, the beginnings of a genuine rapprochement were made by such men as Richard T. Ely, Herbert Casson, Newman Smyth, Francis Peabody, and Gladden. And the Social Gospel was broadened to take in all the various problems of a raw and crude society which had just emerged from an agrarian to an urban status. The Kingdom of God in "Our Country," to use the title of Josiah Strong's famous book, undertook to grapple with problems ranging from public sanitation to boss politics. The movement flowered into a vigorous life which took in such diverse phenomena as Charles Sheldon's novels, the organization of institutional churches, and the founding of the Brotherhood of the Kingdom. Some

gorous souls even changed their minds
out socialism, and sought to reconcile
e basic ends of Christianity and social-
n. One of the best chapters of the
oks describes the meteoric passage of
eorge Davis Herron's striking person-
ity across the stage of American Chris-
anity.

As the Social Gospel entered its period
maturity and recognition it was broad-
ed and deepened both by the progres-
ve political environment of the nation
d by the rediscovery of the ethics of
sus. Walter Rauschenbusch takes his
ace at the high point of this develop-
ent as the formulator of the Social Gos-
l. His thought, gathering together as
did all the many strands of the new
ovement, and proclaiming it with a
inning and liberal persuasiveness as
ell as a deeply Christian passion, is ex-
ounded here with an adequacy which
s not been approached by previous in-
rpreters. Dr. Hopkins is not as critical
the theological foundations of Rausch-
busch's thought as many readers of this
agazine are likely to be. But the ex-
sition is complete; Rauschenbusch's
bt to immanence theology and to revo-
tionary thought is clearly stated. And
hat perhaps is a wholesome corrective
the present-day reaction against many
pects of Rauschenbusch's theology, jus-
e is done to the many-sidedness of his
ought.

It is impossible in brief space to do
ore than hint at the qualities of this
ok. Dr. Hopkins has performed an
tstanding service for all who are con-
rned with the social mission of Chris-
nity.

Dr. Johnson's book is frankly polemi-
l. Concerned with the present contro-
rsy over the theological presupposi-
ons of the Social Gospel, and critical of
ny aspects of the new theology, he seeks within the framework of an essentially liberal theology to do justice to many of the new insights and criticisms. "The Social Gospel Re-Examined" is in short a restatement of liberal theology and ethics by one of their ablest and most clear-headed exponents. The criticism of the new theology is explicit and plain. Speaking of theological tendencies arising out of European social situations, described as "abnormal," Johnson says, "My contention is that in proportion as we desire to keep alive in America the purpose, the ethical movement to which democratic Christian liberalism has given support we should foster a structure of thought that is consistent with it." It would in this reviewer's opinion be possible to question the assumption of this statement concerning the relation between social situations and "structures of conceptual thought consistent" with them. Nevertheless here is a challenge which no one sympathetic to the new theology ought to dodge or duck. The challenge is made more explicit in the charge repeated several times in the course of the book that undue emphasis on divine transcendence and human depravity will sap ethical vigor and deprive Christianity of the moral power to build a new society. Such criticisms deserve a more serious and detailed consideration than to date they have received; and members of the Fellowship of Socialist Christians ought to be grateful to Dr. Johnson for bringing the matter squarely to our attention.

However, when the book passes from criticism to the exposition of the author's own point of view, it seems to this reviewer at least to miss much of the point of present criticism of Liberal Social Gospel thought. Thus Johnson pleads for an "empirical" theology whose rele-

vance to life shall be determined by "operational contexts." For example, the belief of the Puritans in both human depravity and human exaltation is said to result from the Puritan's ability to "use" his theology in the light of "operational contexts." Naturalism divested of its rigorous mechanism and sufficiently widened and loosened to take in human ideals and possibilities is avowed as an adequate philosophy for the Christian ethical enterprise. Speaking from these assumptions Johnson denies that the teachings of Jesus were eschatological, holding to a "developmental" concept which rejects the validity of any thought of a "consummation," not so much on grounds of scriptural exegesis as on the assertion that "orderly process is more normative than catastrophe." Thus the Kingdom of God is placed within history as a goal "envisioned but never achieved." Just how these two terms are related is not made clear: if a goal is within history is it not per se achievable, and if it is not attainable is it not thereby excluded from the realm of the historical? Proceeding to the concept of human nature, Johnson holds man to be not so much "depraved" as "deprived." Further, there is no difference of kind between God and man; man is potentially divine. "The essential truth . . . is that man is under an absolute mandate to express divinity in his own nature and his whole life." The Social Gospel is held to be possible only on the basis of the "indefinite perfectability" of human nature. In the exposition of such conceptions as these, nowhere does Dr. Johnson take adequate cognizance of the searching criticism which the new theology has undertaken of the whole structure of liberal thought.

JOHN HUTCHINSON.

THE NATURE AND DESTINY OF MAN. A Christian Interpretation. Volume I: Human Nature. *By Reinhold Niebuhr.* 300 p. Scribner's, New York. $2.75.

This is the richest and most scientific book Reinhold Niebuhr has written. It is the elaboration of the first part of his Gifford Lectures, delivered in Edinburgh, 1939. The second volume, dealing with more theological consequences of the anthropological ideas will appear in about a year. Then we shall have a theological system, the importance of which for the theological situation in this country cannot be overestimated.

"Man as a Problem to Himself" is the title of the first chapter in which, after some introductory pages, the classical, the Christian and the modern views of man are developed and interpreted. The purpose of this chapter is to give a general picture of the historical situation concerning the doctrine of man. It is my opinion that most of the scholarly criticism of the book will be launched against this section. Though I find myself in a very large agreement with the later parts I feel some doubts about this predominantly historical chapter. It shows a very natural tendency to emphasize the points of difference between the Christian and the non-Christian doctrines of man and the shortcomings of the latter in comparison with the Biblical anthropology. The difficulty of such a simple comparison is that the classical and the Biblical doctrine of man have not developed on the same level. Niebuhr feels this himself when he writes that the "pessimism of Greek tragedy is somewhat different from that of the philosophers and most nearly approaches the Christian interpretation of Life" (p. 10).

The point is that Greek tragedy is a

much more immediate expression of Greek religion than philosophy is. Philosophy, although having a religious basis, at least unconsciously, is directed towards the forms and structures of being in a theoretical attitude of distance, while religion, although receiving philosophical elements, is an expression of our ultimate concern about the meaning of being for us, demanding an existential attitude of decision. Therefore a simple comparison between the doctrines of man in philosophy and religion is impossible. An example in Niebuhr's words may show this difficulty: "The Bible knows nothing of a good mind and an evil body," while in Greek philosophy mind or spirit are essentially good (p. 7). But the actual human mind is not good in Greek philosophy. Plato and Aristotle, the Cynics and the Stoics had much to say about the blindness of man's actual mind and the distortion of man's actual spirit. Some of these judgments even entered the New Testament. And, on the other hand, the fact that St. John speaks of God as "spirit" (not body) and that St. Paul defines the power of sinful reality as "flesh" (which is characteristic of the body) shows that the Bible is not far from the Aristotelian anthropology of degrees. For Aristotle also gives the body a comparatively high ontological position although a lower one than the mind. The mind is good in Greek philosophy as far as it is united with the structure of being, the true being, the pure form or idea, the universal Logos. And this is also the case in Christianity and in modern idealism. It is not possible to say of Kant that "man is cut in two. The part which is immersed in natural process is essentially evil and the part which is subject to reason is essentially good" (p. 119). Kant's doctrine of the transcendent perversion of the "maxims" of will by unconditioned freedom (as the analogous doctrines of Plato and many of the greatest minds) points to a quite different direction. Neither is "spirit essentially good" (p. 120) for Hegel if the spirit in nature, man and history is meant. The divine spirit, its essential potentiality and its eternal fulfilment is good. But in time and history the spirit is subject to "self-alienation" and nothing spiritual occurs without passion and interest. Therefore if Niebuhr says that "Hegelian rationalism . . . glorifies rational man as essential man," p. 36) everything depends here (as well as in the Aristotelian definition of man as "rational animal") on the understanding of "reason." If it is interpreted as human reasoning, it certainly cannot become the characteristic of essential man. But if it means the participation of man in the "rational universal," in the Logos as united with Being, then it is the description of essential man. This example to which many others (concerning for instance Marx and Nietzsche) could be added shows that any comparison between philosophical and theological doctrines of man must distinguish the merely theoretical and the existential elements in both of them and must not compare theoretical with existential elements undialectically. Niebuhr has avoided this mistake in most instances, but there are statements, especially in the historical section which contain too simple and direct comparisons of philosophical and religious doctrines.

The second chapter deals with "The Problem of Vitality and Form in Human Nature." Psychological insight and a direct and existential understanding of the actual world situation are united in the statement and development of this fundamental problem. Nobody who desires to make a thorough judgment about the present world situation and about the

recent developments in ethics should fail to read this section. Marx and Nietzsche are confronted, the Freudian psychology is used and criticized, the liberal belief in a progressive harmony of form and vitality is torn into shreds. I should like to know what those who are faithful to the presupposition of modern civilization will answer to the critical question involved in Niebuhr's analysis of the unsolved conflict of vitality and form in this civilization.

The third chapter analyzes the problem of individuality in modern culture, its rise in the Renaissance, its growth under the influence of bourgeois activism and its loss in naturalism, idealism and romanticism. The historical material collected for the sake of proving the anti-individualistic trend of modern culture is especially impressive. Individualism is necessarily transmuted into nationalism; this is proved historically and systematically by Niebuhr: "Without the presuppositions of the Christian faith the individual is either nothing or becomes everything" (p. 91). The keen understanding of the present events in world history by the author makes his arguments irrefutable.

The main battle against the modern mind is fought in the fourth chapter: "The Easy Conscience of the Modern Man." Niebuhr writes: "The most surprising aspect of the modern man's good conscience is that he asserts and justifies it in terms of the most varied and even contradictory metaphysical theories and social philosophers" (p. 93). The easy conscience of modern man is not identical with his optimism concerning man and history. Niebuhr knows that there is a strong undercurrent of pessimism in eighteenth and nineteenth century bourgeois philosophy which came to the surface in twentieth century political romanticism. But even the typical pessimists show this easy conscience which means that in all of them there is a negation of the Christian idea that human existence is the result of a Fall from essential goodness and that man is responsible for it and that it cannot be overcome under the conditions of existence. Instead of that modern man regards his existence as the result of natural or historical causes, which must either be accepted in tragic heroism or which can be conquered in historical progress.

Chapter V is called: "The Relevance of the Christian View of Man." It shows that the questions involved in human existence, which modern naturalism or idealism or vitalism cannot answer, are answered in principle in the Christian view of man. There is a common source of error in modern estimates of man: "Man is not measured in a dimension sufficiently high or deep to do full justice to either his stature or his capacity for both good and evil or to understand the total environment in which such a stature can understand, express and find itself" (p. 124). This is different in the Christian interpretation of man: "In this divine transcendence the spirit of man finds a home in which it can understand its stature of freedom. But there it also finds the limits of its freedom, the judgment which is spoken against it, and, ultimately, the mercy which makes such a judgment sufferable" (p. 126).

The following chapter VI: "Man as Image of God and as Creature" explains the meaning of human finiteness in terms which are dependent on the recent "philosophy of existence." Again and again the difference between finiteness and sin is emphasized against all dualistic attempts to derive sin from finiteness.

The two large chapters on "Man as Sinner" (VII and VIII) bring the ethical

aterial spread through Niebuhr's pre-ding writings to systematic complete-ss; it is the most mature and most elab-ated doctrine of sin we have from Nie-ihr and, as I think, we have in present nerican theology.

In chapter IX: "Original Sin and an's Responsibility," the doctrine of n is continued from a more speculative int of view. The earlier discussion of e problem between Pelagius and Au-stine is reinterpreted in terms of mod-n psychology, especially of Kierke-ard's essay on "Angst." The literalistic terpretations of the Biblical myth are mly dismissed as dangerous errors.

The last and in some ways most inter-ting chapter (X) defines "Justitia Or-inalis." The main thesis is stated in e following words: "It is impossible to justice to the concept of the image of od and to the perfection of that image fore the Fall without making a distinc-on between the essential nature of man d the virtue of conformity to that ture. Nothing can change the essen-l nature and structure, just as blind-ss of the eye does not remove the eye om the human anatomy. . . . On the her hand the freedom of man creates e possibility of actions which are con-ary to and in defiance of the require-ents of this essential nature" (p. 269). he extremely significant consequences this statement are developed by Nie-ihr in speculative terms in the sub-apter on the "Locus of Original Right-usness" (namely the trans-historical oment "before action"), and in ethical ms in the sub-chapter on "Justitia riginalis as Law."

This survey must suffice to give a gen-al indication of the abundance of ma-rial and penetrating thought in Nie-ihr's book. It is a masterpiece, and it will reintroduce large sections of the present theological generation into the profounder problems of Christian theology.

PAUL TILLICH.

WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? *by Harold J. Laski.* Viking Press, New York. 192pp. $1.75.

Professor Laski is unquestionably the most lucid spokesman on behalf of British democracy today. While Churchill's pronouncements, for example, have the virtue of impeccable grammar, the context of his words are often confusing, and what is more, misleading. Additional comparisons are unnecessary, since Laski and Churchill are the only English leaders at home today who are both articulate and intelligent. Since Laski has never held a governmental office, and the extent of his political life has been to serve as a member of the National Executive Committee of the British Labour Party, the coupling of his name with that of Churchill as an English leader may come as a surprise to some readers. For Laski himself has often gone out of the way to impress upon friends, students and well-wishers his aversion for public office. Notwithstanding, Laski's aid to Labour's Cabinet Ministers, his books, and his speeches to Labour meetings, have made him a decisive public force. At the Bournemouth conference of 1940, for instance, he made a speech which clinched the day for the National Executive which had decided to form a coalition government with Churchill.

Today, Laski speaks for the Labour Movement of Great Britain. In his present book he tells us where to go, indeed, where we must go, if Fascism is to be exorcised from the world. The burden of this work is to emphasize that a dual fight must be waged if Britain is to win

the war and free the enslaved nations which are already under Hitler's domination.

Laski believes that the battle must be fought on two fronts, against Fascism abroad and against capitalism at home. While the domestic issue of the conflict with capitalism must be subordinated for the moment in the face of military exigencies, it is a tribute to Laski that he does not subordinate it basically. He believes, furthermore, that there can be no real resolution of the present conflict unless it is recognized that the two struggles are indissolubly linked. Fascism must be defeated as a political, social, and economic force and democracy must be extended so that it becomes a working trinity of social, economic and political egalitarianism, and not a disabled trinity with only one or two of the three elements functioning.

Many supporters of Britain's war effort have not yet envisaged the long range responsibility for the democratic cause which Mr. Laski analyzes so lucidly. But Laski is not content with a statement of general principles. He works out his thesis in detail and proves to what degree Hitler has been able to exploit the contradiction between capitalism and democracy. He arrives at the conclusion that the transformation which is needed to save democracy from both internal and external peril, "must be big enough in range and depth to make it evident that the partnership between privilege and the masses is of permanent character."

In Laski's third section entitled "What Are We to Do Next?" he advocates a "revolution by consent" as an answer to the problem he has raised. The author does not take this voluntary accommodation for granted as inevitable. He merely thinks that the capitalists have a chance to make this rapprochement. Judging from my own contacts with Professor Laski, I am certain that he must be skeptical of such a possibility. For this reason something seems to be lacking in this otherwise excellent book. Max Lerner has expressed the same criticism with the suggestion that Mr. Laski should have written another section of his book in which he explored the psychology of capitalists in the present crisis and explained why he thought it possible that they might arrive at the hoped for accommodation to the needs of democracy.

ERIC ESTORICK.

FELLOWSHIP NOTES

The Midwinter meeting of the Fellowship of Socialist Christians was held on January 30th at Union Theological Seminary. The chairman of the program was Jack Hutchinson. Professor H. Richard Niebuhr spoke in the afternoon on "The Christian's Responsibility in a World of Conflict." He emphasized the necessity of discriminating between the motives and the "context" in which various social policies were initiated. He thought it important for Christians to recognize that the motives of some interventionists and some isolationists might be primarily selfish from the national standpoint, while other interventionists and isolationists might be prompted by universalistic rather than egoistic motives. The same distinction was made with regard to capitalists and socialists.

The discussion was primarily concerned with the relative importance of the actual consequence of various policies in comparison with the motives which prompted them. Is it not important, it was asked, to know whether isolationism or interventionism, socialism or capital-

ı is the best vehicle for the universal against the egoistic motive? The aker did not deny the importance of s distinction, but maintained that the ɔng motive could press any social icy into its service and could corrupt better purpose.

ın the evening Professor Eduard Heinn of the New School spoke on "Social tice in a Defense Economy," and emasized the great distinction between icies necessary and adequate until full ployment is reached, and those which uld be required after the unemployed absorbed. He discussed what forms taxation and loans in the latter case uld be most useful in limiting the rket of consumers goods so as to free ustry for the manufacture of defense plements, and in cutting off luxuries ore necessities are touched. Professor imann emphasized that living standards must not be allowed to fall until full employment is reached, but that when full employment is reached, a reduction in living standards is inevitable. It is not inevitable, however, that living standards be equally affected. A proper social and taxation policy could increase the relative social justice of a society within a general tendency toward lower standards. Professor Heimann deplored the recently announced conscription of labor in Britain before a conscription of wealth had been effected, and regarded it as the kind of defeat for labor rights against which we must guard in a defense situation.

Mr. Robert Frey of Union Seminary conducted the worship service. The meeting was well attended both afternoon and evening and everyone voted the addresses and discussions most profitable.

Contributors to This Issue

Eduard Heimann is Professor of Economics at the New School of Social Research in New York City.

Wilhelm Pauck is Professor of Church History at Chicago Theological Seminary.

Clifford Stanley is rector of Christ Church, Cape Girardeau, Missouri.

Paul Tillich is Professor of Philosophical Theology at Union Theological Seminary in New York City.

Dorothy Fosdick is instructor in Sociology at Smith College, Northampton, Massachusetts.

John Hutchinson is a graduate student at Union Theological Seminary in New York City.

Charles Stinnette is curate of Trinity Church in Hartford, Connecticut.

Eric Estorick is on the faculty of New York University.

Reinhold Niebuhr's
GIFFORD LECTURES

The Nature and Destiny of Man

1. HUMAN NATURE

A Christian Interpretation

A major contribution to contemporary thought—theological, political and philosophical. Dr. Niebuhr's interpretation of the nature of man—"based upon the conviction that there are resources in the Christian faith for an understanding of human nature which have been lost in modern culture"—is the substance of a volume at once stimulating, timely and profound. $2.75

•

Wisdom and Folly in Religion

by Joseph Haroutunian

"Dr. Haroutunian has succeeded with singular accuracy and effectiveness in dealing with the fundamentals of Protestant Christianity at the crucial points at which they really touch the life of man. . . . What is urgently important is, in my judgment, a faithful and compelling renewal of the true insights of Protestant thought."—*Dr. Paul Lehmann, Eden Theological Seminary.* $2.00

•

The Search for the Real Jesus

by Chester Charlton McCown

"Alive and moving . . . a comprehensive review of the changing historical interpretation of Jesus."—*New York Times.* $2.50

At bookstores **CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS · NEW YORK**